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The critical study of political discourse has up until very recently rested solely within the 
domain of the social sciences.  Working within a linguistics framework, Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), in particular Fairclough (Fairclough 1989, 1995a, 1995b, 
2001; Fairclough and Wodak 1997), has been heavily influenced by Foucault.
2
  The 
linguistic theory that CDA and critical linguistics especially (which CDA subsumes) has 
traditionally drawn upon is Halliday‟s Systemic-Functional Grammar, which is largely 
concerned with the function of language in the social structure
3
 (Fowler et al. 1979; 
Fowler 1991; Kress and Hodge 1979).    
 
Chilton (2005a: 3) states that “CDA has tended to draw … on social theory of a particular 
type and on linguistics of a particular type.”  It is my intention here to suggest that the 
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cognitive sciences offer ideas significant to the CD analyst and yet which are still to be 
appropriated by mainstream CDA – exceptions to this with various cognitive approaches 
are Chilton (1996, 2004, 2005a, 2005b), Chilton and Lakoff (1995), Lakoff (1991, 1996, 
2003), O‟Halloran (2003), van Dijk (1998, 2002), and to a lesser extent Dirven (2001) 
and Lee (1992).  With a cognitive perspective a new methodology for the identification 
and analysis of linguistic manipulation (a principle objective of CDA) can be constructed, 
CDA perhaps becoming more revealing than at present and some of its existing claims 
better attested.  This methodology is derived from research in two areas of cognitive 
science; cognitive linguistics and cognitive-evolutionary psychology.  Cognitive 
linguistics itself is a framework for the analysis of language.  In this context, then, 
cognitive linguistics provides a new framework for the analysis of political language 
specifically.  Concepts in cognitive linguistics provide a tool-kit, as Halliday‟s Systemic 
Functional Grammar does for critical linguistics, for the identification and analysis of 
linguistic and psychological strategies for manipulation in political discourse.  
Furthermore, cognitive-evolutionary psychology raises hypotheses as to a particular kind 
of manipulative discourse – discourse in which information is detailed that may 
activate/exploit innate cognitive programmes.  Let us now very sketchily consider the 
application of this methodology to one currently prevalent political issue, namely 
immigration.     
 
Cognitive linguistics holds that there are certain image schemata which constitute the 
foundations of human reason (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999; Johnson 1987; Lakoff 
1987).  Further, these schemata are said to be embodied.  One such schema is that of 
CONTAINMENT.  On the embodiment of the container concept, Johnson (1987: 21) 
states that “our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive 
features of our bodily experience.”  It is this concept on which the political discourse 
surrounding immigration is constructed.
4
  Our country is conceptualised as a container, 
where a container consists of three salient structures: an interior and an exterior defined 
by a boundary - the boundary element of a Container-Nation being its political borders.  
This schema is most obviously activated (in English) with the spatial prepositions in and 
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out, markers frequently used to describe the spatial relation between Trajector (TR) – 
(person) and Landmark (LM) – (country).5     
 
In conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999) properties from the 
source domain, in our case the CONTAINER schema, are mapped onto the target 
domain.  “The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one thing in terms 
of another” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 5).  In the more recent theory of conceptual 
blending, which, beginning with the notion of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994) offers an 
explanation of dynamic cognitive phenomena such as metaphor (Fauconnier and Turner 
1996, 2002; Fauconnier 1997), the blended space “inherits partial structure from the input 
spaces, and has emergent structure of its own” (Fauconnier and Turner 1996: 113).  One 
consequence, or entailment, of the Container-Nation metaphor is that nations, like 
containers, are conceptualised as having limited space.  Consider the example of 
immigration discourse below, which is taken from the UK Independence Party‟s official 
website:
6
 
 
With the fourth largest economy in world, the UK is the very attractive destination for 
people seeking a better life.  [1] The trouble is the UK is already full up.  The 
average population density of England is twice that of Germany, four times that of the 
France, and twelve times that of the United States.  [2] We are bursting at the seams.
7
  
[my bold] 
 
Sentences [1] and [2] highlighted in the above text nicely demonstrate the Container-
Nation metaphor. In actual fact, the text (or rather the author of the text) is using the 
metaphor to justify the party‟s immigration policy.  In [1] the nation is being 
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conceptualised as a non-specified container which is „full up‟.  In [2] „bursting at the 
seams‟ activates a clothing frame (on frames see Fillmore 1982), where items of clothing 
are conceptualised as containers (for example, „I can‟t get into these jeans‟).  In this case 
the delimiting boundary element of the container (the „seams‟) is conceptualised as being 
stretched beyond capacity.  If, as the tenets of cognitive linguistics maintain, metaphor is 
a cognitive reasoning process rather than simply surface-level linguistic flare, then 
metaphor in political discourse is highly significant for the CD analyst.
8
  Another 
metaphor, for example, Nation as Cuisine, where immigration is a vital ingredient, would 
prompt for a wholly different conceptualisation, would have different emergent structure 
in blending theory terms, of nation and immigration.
9
   
 
Hopefully I have demonstrated to the reader, all be it incompletely, one way in which 
cognitive linguistics can be utilised in the critical analysis of political discourse.  I shall 
now turn to the second element of our cognitive methodology and aim to do the same for 
cognitive-evolutionary psychology. 
 
Evolutionary psychologists view the mind as a mass of interconnected but distinct 
modular programs, each of which is “functionally responsible for solving a different 
adaptive problem” (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 91) faced by our ancestors during the 
EEA.
10
  One such program is the cheater-detection module (Cosmides and Tooby 1989).  
Starting from the posit that in social species in which cooperative or altruistic
11
 behaviour 
is practiced, individuals must guard against the risks of exploitation, which is damaging 
to one‟s inclusive fitness12, it is postulated that a cheater-detection module has evolved to 
detect these risks, leading to cognitive and behavioural processes to counter them.  One 
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form of exploitation would be non-reciprocation to altruistic behaviour, i.e., exploitation 
by individuals who take but give nothing in return.  
 
If information likely to activate the cheater-detection module is detailed in the language 
of political actors, which members of the electorate take to be propositionally true, then 
such language, we might want to suggest, is manipulative.  Consider an example taken 
from a speech given by the Conservative party leader in Telford during the 2005 UK 
election campaign
13
: 
 
Our asylum system is being abused – and with it Britain‟s generosity.  Only two out of 
ten people who claim asylum in Britain today are genuine refugees.  [my bold] 
 
The words highlighted are all candidates for words which might activate the cheater-
detection module.  „Generosity‟ and „abused‟ are terms clearly linked with altruism and 
exploitation.  „Claims‟ need to be verified for their authenticity or „genuineness‟ and if 
they prove to be „non-genuine‟ they are considered exploitative.  If individuals come to 
hold through the processing of political discourse that they are being exploited by 
immigration, then their cheater-detection module may be activated, affecting their 
(political) decision-making processes and leading to anti-immigration attitudes.   
 
I have very crudely described just one module of the mind hypothesised by cognitive-
evolutionary psychology which, if activated through discourse, is of interest to CD 
analysts.  Others might include, for example, fear systems and other emotion programs or 
a kin-protection module.   
 
With a cognitive methodology it is hoped that CDA can both progress further as an 
academic discipline and, as an instrument with which to highlight social manipulation 
enacted through discourse, become more emancipatory.  Perhaps, though, the most 
important contribution that its integration with cognitive science can make to CDA, as 
well, in fact, as to our understanding of the human language process, is an answer to the 
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most fundamental charge facing CDA:  does discourse matter?  Is CDA merely engaged 
in the observation of surface-level linguistic representation or does political rhetoric have 
Orwellian effects?  And if so, can we give a cognitive account of how they are achieved, 
of the mental processes involved?  It is worth exploring, with the most recent findings on 
cognitive processing and cognitive modelling, evidence for the link, in cognition, 
between discourse and conceptual representation, and between conceptual representation 
and other cognitive domains.  Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), for 
example, demonstrates that inferences prompted by discourse form part of the meaning, 
that is, conceptual representation, constructed from discourse.  Conceptual blending 
demonstrates, because processing is carried out in the blended space, that metaphors 
matter.  The human capacity for stimulus-detached processing means that information 
acquired through discourse and stored in memory can activate other cognitive 
programmes.  And neurological (neuroimaging) studies present evidence that language 
can activate the amygdala (Isenberg et al. 1999), the centre for the emotions in the 
brain.
14
  This all given, then certain language-use (discourse) could influence 
conceptualisation and cognition, manipulating the individual into a position of support for 
some policy.   
 
It is not yet clear whether these suggestions can be substantiated or how they could be 
formulated to construct a complete and lucid cognitive model for meaningful 
appropriation in the critical analysis of political discourse.  Here, rather than set about 
making definitive claims, it has been my intention only to open and invite dialogue and 
debate on the ideas presented, creating a possible avenue for future research.   
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